Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Little Bets

Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

I just finished reading the book Little Bets: How Breakthrough Ideas Emerge From Small Discoveries by Peter Sims.  It is a pretty good book which I highly recommend.  (One thing I liked about it was that it was short – it had one idea and did not spend 200 extra pages trying to pretend to be something it was not.)

 

One of the principles of Little Bets is to try things (in a small way) and not to be afraid of making small mistakes.  This strategy in turn will lead to large insights and grand successes.

 

In risk management we do not like mistakes at all, whether they be large or small.  Perhaps it is time that we rethink mindset role of risk management.

 

As readers of my blogs know, I am of the school that believes that risk management departments should help firms make money as well as help prevent them from losing money – as opposed to solely prevent them from losing money.  It is a philosophical stance that not everyone will agree with.  However for those who do agree with me, then little bets is something to seriously consider.

 

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

European Bank Funding and Deleveraging

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

The BIS Quarterly Report, (N. Vause, G. von Peter, M. Drehmann and V. Sushko, March 2012) notes European banks have experienced a liquidity crisis as continued financial deleveraging is placing a fragile recovery at risk, but fail to address long-term solvency issues.

 

European banks experienced extreme pressure to deleverage in late 2011 as funding strains intensified, increasing pressure to sell assets and ration credit as economic activity was weaker. Capital adequacy issues surfaced due to bank sovereign debt exposure.  New regulatory measures requiring banks to meet more stringent capital standards by mid-2012 added to these fears. 

 

European banks did sell certain assets and cut some types of lending, notably those denominated in dollars and those attracting higher risk weights.  This led to government policymaker concerns that the reduced lending would impact real economic activity.  Other credit suppliers (asset managers, other financial institutions & bond investors) helped to mitigate the credit squeeze, so there was little evidence from the BIS of a major impact on lending volumes or asset prices.

 

European central banks introduced special policy measures in December, resulting in improved European banks' funding conditions.  Previously, many banks had been unable to raise funds in the unsecured senior bond market, and the cost of unsecured money market funding had risen to levels previously exceeded only during the 2008 crisis.  Dollar funding had become especially expensive.  Two three-year lending operations (LTRO) by the ECB and a wider set of collateral than was previously eligible relieved much of the stress.  Furthermore, the cost of swapping euros into dollars fell in December, as central banks reduced the costs of their international swap lines.  Short-term borrowing costs then declined and unsecured bond issuance revived.  The view is these measures should limit the impact on financial markets and economic activity. 

 

The measures adopted by the central banks helped to mitigate near-term funding and capital concerns, but the long-term solvency issues remain unresolved.  However, the impact of the central banks’ action remains uneven across the European Union.

 

The massive injections of liquidity by the ECB helped avoid a crisis, there is little evidence that this funding has trickled down to countries and households in the peripheral countries.  The result is the credit contraction in countries such as Portugal and Spain lead to more bankruptcies, even-higher unemployment and a deeper economic contraction that will limit any recovery.  This suggests that ECB actions may provide only temporary relief.

 

The lesson for risk management is that temporary, stop-gap measures are not the best long-term solution and may come at a price.

 

For more information on this follow the link: www.bis.org/press/p120312.htm

Monday, March 19, 2012

Bridgeway

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.,

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

Last Friday I had the pleasure of interviewing Lucinda Low who is the founder and director of Bridgeway Academy which is a school that develops children with learning disabilities. 

 

Bridgeway Academy has been successful by any stretch of the imagination.  It is a model for several other schools across North America and Ms. Low is sought out for her expertise.  Based on the success of Bridgeway it is reasonable to assume that Ms. Low has advanced degrees in education.  It would also be reasonable to assume that she has done extensive research on child education.  Nope – she simply developed a school that teaches students with disabilities “the way they learn”.  No grand research studies.  No grand 10 year plans.  No extensive controlled research studies.  Just great success. 

 

Risk managers have lots to learn from Ms. Low.  Forget the grand theories and the approved frameworks that everyone says that you need to implement.  Forget the credentials.  Just deal with organizations the way they work, keeping in mind the context in which they work.  Simple.  Successful.

 

Friday, March 16, 2012

Learning Risk

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

Can you learn to be a good risk manager?  Can you learn to be a good golfer?  Can you learn to be a good tennis player?

 

My dad used to be the caretaker for the church tennis courts – back in the days when churches had such things as real clay tennis courts.  While I was developing as a competitive junior player he was forced to watch way more tennis than he cared to.  He also spent more time reading tennis magazines than he cared to.  The upshot of all this is that my dad knew a heck of a lot about tennis.  However he was not a tennis player.  He never bothered, nor did he have the inclination to pick up a racket and play. 

 

It is the same with golfers.  I have a lot of friends who are crazy about the game – reading all that they can and hitting the links or the driving range at every opportunity.  They know a lot about the game of golf – but they suck at it.

 

Knowing a lot about a subject does not necessarily make you an expert.  Risk is a subject where a lot of people know a lot about the subject, but like my golfer friends they are not necessarily the best at it.  Risk, like golf and tennis is a skill.  Yes – it requires knowledge, but knowledge only gets you started.  You need the practice, the passion, the wisdom, and a thirst to get better.  And that is just the list to starting to be a good risk manager – or golfer – or tennis player.

 

Thursday, March 15, 2012

What are You Content With?

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

I just finished Roger Ebert’s autobiography “Life Itself: A Memoir”.  It has absolutely nothing to do with risk management – or at least not the type of risk management that we discuss in this blog on a regular basis.  That by itself is a great reason to read it – explore new ideas and new areas of thought.

 

Despite it being a book about the life of a movie critic, the book closes with some interesting thoughts on life.  One in particular I thought was interesting and definitely applied to risk management.  In his conclusion to his memoir as he starts talking about the meaning of life, Roger comes up with this gem; “I am more content with questions than answers.” 

 

Sometimes as risk managers we focus way too much on the answers and are not content enough with getting some of the questions right.  Perhaps the profession would be better off with more contentment with good questions, and less disappointment at not being able to find those sometimes non-existent answers.

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Basel Regulation Needs to be Rethought in the Age of Derivatives, Part

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

  

Paul Atkinson and Adrian Blundell-Wignall, in a second VOXEU communique (Feb 29th) suggest that further reforms are needed to change and simplify of Basel III capital rules. 

 

Atkinson and Blundell-Wignall note that the design in the Basel framework for regulating bank capital adequacy has resulted in a “vast, poorly diversified, highly interconnected banking system” supported by a far too-small capital base.  The system is inflexible to adjust to external shocks, so local problems can become systemic.  They suggest the system can be placed on a firmer foundation by the following changes:   (1) simplification of capital requirements; (2) realistic and less complex financial supervision; and (3) more reliance on market discipline. 

 

The authors suggest that a risk-weight system for capital charges be replaced by a leverage ratio with an upper limit.  This includes reporting of gross derivative positions, according to international accounting standards, in the asset base that require equity support without the distortions using netting permitted GAAP reporting rules for calculating capital charges (not always zero risk).  Otherwise, Basel III capital rules may produce outcomes that are less stable.  Bank activities should be separated into low-risk and high-risk activities (through separate subsidiaries – legal vehicles) to limit equity base exposure to losses from any single activity (trading).  This allows each subsidiary to have its own equity base while limiting government guarantee programs to specific activities such as retail banking—but not derivative trading.  This eliminates the cross-subsidization of other activities and makes the banking system less vulnerable to shocks.  

 

Liquidity management rules serve little purpose and should be replaced with a better capital-adequacy framework and resolution structure.  There are limits to supervisor’s abilities and resources which places limits on what they can accomplish.  This might suggest simplification of the regulatory structure and strive for accident prevention rather than micro management of large, complex financial institutions.

 

Lastly, there is a need to simplify and reduce bank interconnectedness to increase the reliance on market discipline.  This would allow large creditors that provide a much larger fraction of bank funding than shareholders, to be exposed to losses for their mistakes.  This combined with the leverage limits might reduce reliance on wholesale funding and trading activity.  The simplification of the complex bank interconnections could lower counterparty vulnerability to systemic risk.   The idea is to reduce the too-big-to-fail syndrome and the implicit guarantee that is associated with it.  Large bank creditors are exposed to more losses and may help limit government exposure to those activities that require high levels of capital support.

 

The failure to identify and mitigate the risks left by Basel III could be a costly mistake.

 

For more on this, follow the link: www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7678

        

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Let’s take it nice and easy … but it never is! (or Thank goodness for Donald Rumsfeld!)

by Stephen McPhie, CA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

I was in Edinburgh yesterday at a presentation by Lionel Barber, Editor of the Financial Times of London.  He was more optimistic about the U.S. than Europe and very skeptical about the “managed” growth statistics coming out of China.  He thinks Greece will leave the Euro, there will not be a war with Iran and Obama, and Cameron are wrong to dismiss the possibility of the leftist Hollande becoming French President in this year’s election.  Etc., etc.  Overall, if he is correct, slightly on the optimistic side for many companies that have currency and commodity exposures, although the latter could put the cat among the pigeons in terms of what may happen to the Euro.

 

Many C-suiters take a measured view about how things will unfold.  Just like the inevitable talk of soft landings.  But human nature and psychology have a nasty habit of participating in the unfolding of events.  We don’t get soft landings – we get busts.  We never get what we expect.  Some small inconsequential thing blows up.  Do you run your enterprise depending upon a balanced and measured view of the future?  Or do you expect to have a head on collision with “unknown unknowns”?  (Thank goodness for Donald Rumsfeld!)