*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
In a typical movie about business it would not be out of place to hear a
boss, or a CEO, yell "I want answers and I want them now!" Perhaps you
had a boss yell that this morning, or perhaps you yelled it yourself at your
own team.
We all want answers. However answers are only as good as the questions.
Poor questions and you get poor answers. Also, in this day and age of
Wikipedia and consultants, answers are easy to come by.
So why the focus on answers? How come we do not hear more bosses yelling
"I want great questions and I want them now"!
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Friday, April 11, 2014
Wednesday, April 9, 2014
QBism
*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
Just finished a very interesting article on QBism – Quantum Bayesianism –
by Hans Christian von Baeyer (ScinentificAmerican.com, June 2013)
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wave-function/ [2]. In the
article the author describes QBism which simplifying (greatly simplifying)
states that the wave function of particle physics is a mathematical tool –
nothing more. Thus arguments about wave-particle duality (is a sub-atomic
particle a wave function of probabilistic energy, or is it a particle) have
no validity.
I believe that in risk management we often give more physical reality to our
mathematical risk models than we ought to. As an extreme example that I
will use solely for illustration, many derivative textbooks talk about the
volatility skew puzzle of option pricing, as if volatility is a physical
trait that a financial asset should be self-aware of.
Perhaps to make it a little more concrete, how often has a risk manager (or a
trader) said that they think vol (volatility) is going to increase? They
say it in the same way that they might say that they think it might rain
tomorrow. Volatility however is a mathematical construct. Rain is a real
physical object.
Perhaps it is time for a bit more QBism in risk.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wave-function/
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
Just finished a very interesting article on QBism – Quantum Bayesianism –
by Hans Christian von Baeyer (ScinentificAmerican.com, June 2013)
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wave-function/ [2]. In the
article the author describes QBism which simplifying (greatly simplifying)
states that the wave function of particle physics is a mathematical tool –
nothing more. Thus arguments about wave-particle duality (is a sub-atomic
particle a wave function of probabilistic energy, or is it a particle) have
no validity.
I believe that in risk management we often give more physical reality to our
mathematical risk models than we ought to. As an extreme example that I
will use solely for illustration, many derivative textbooks talk about the
volatility skew puzzle of option pricing, as if volatility is a physical
trait that a financial asset should be self-aware of.
Perhaps to make it a little more concrete, how often has a risk manager (or a
trader) said that they think vol (volatility) is going to increase? They
say it in the same way that they might say that they think it might rain
tomorrow. Volatility however is a mathematical construct. Rain is a real
physical object.
Perhaps it is time for a bit more QBism in risk.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wave-function/
Thursday, April 3, 2014
10,000 Hours
*/by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc./*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
While aimlessly skimming the online sports editorials – procrastinating
from doing real work – I came across a series of articles that rehashed the
nature versus nurture article for athletic success; the old "are champions
made or are they born?" debate.
It appears that the answer is both. In this age of professionalism, you
need the proper genes and you need the 10,000 hours of purposeful practice to
succeed. One article I browsed also made the fact that many parents have
mistakenly zeroed in on the 10,000 hours theory and have had their offspring
focus exclusively on purposeful practice in a single sport so as to achieve
the greatness they desire (presumably by living vicariously through their
kids). The article cited several studies that showed that kids that
specialized in one sport on average underperformed as they aged, and did
significantly worse in their athletic achievements than those kids who played
a variety of sports early in their sporting careers (such as they are as a 10
year old).
I think there are a couple of lessons here for risk managers. Currently
there seems to be a focus on concentrated learning and a sole focus to risk
management that is needed to become a successful risk manager. It is
somewhat analogous to the 10,000 hour theory. It also is consistent with
the nurture theory of sport greatness. In other words, great risk managers
can be made if only enough focus, attention and dedication to the profession
is given to the individual.
I believe the nature versus nurture argument from sports shows us that you
need a natural inclination or talent for the field before you can become an
expert in it. Also I believe that sports show us that focusing in on one
discipline actually hinders growth and development as they pertain to
mastery.
Great risk managers are a combination of a natural inclination for the
discipline as well as dedicated study in the discipline. However to become
a great risk manager you also need to expand your interests well beyond risk
management in order to gain new insights from other fields that can then be
applied to risk. Becoming a great risk manager is a function of both nature
and nurture.
My skimming the sport editorials may have been procrastination at its worst,
but at least I got a blog idea out of it.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc./*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
While aimlessly skimming the online sports editorials – procrastinating
from doing real work – I came across a series of articles that rehashed the
nature versus nurture article for athletic success; the old "are champions
made or are they born?" debate.
It appears that the answer is both. In this age of professionalism, you
need the proper genes and you need the 10,000 hours of purposeful practice to
succeed. One article I browsed also made the fact that many parents have
mistakenly zeroed in on the 10,000 hours theory and have had their offspring
focus exclusively on purposeful practice in a single sport so as to achieve
the greatness they desire (presumably by living vicariously through their
kids). The article cited several studies that showed that kids that
specialized in one sport on average underperformed as they aged, and did
significantly worse in their athletic achievements than those kids who played
a variety of sports early in their sporting careers (such as they are as a 10
year old).
I think there are a couple of lessons here for risk managers. Currently
there seems to be a focus on concentrated learning and a sole focus to risk
management that is needed to become a successful risk manager. It is
somewhat analogous to the 10,000 hour theory. It also is consistent with
the nurture theory of sport greatness. In other words, great risk managers
can be made if only enough focus, attention and dedication to the profession
is given to the individual.
I believe the nature versus nurture argument from sports shows us that you
need a natural inclination or talent for the field before you can become an
expert in it. Also I believe that sports show us that focusing in on one
discipline actually hinders growth and development as they pertain to
mastery.
Great risk managers are a combination of a natural inclination for the
discipline as well as dedicated study in the discipline. However to become
a great risk manager you also need to expand your interests well beyond risk
management in order to gain new insights from other fields that can then be
applied to risk. Becoming a great risk manager is a function of both nature
and nurture.
My skimming the sport editorials may have been procrastination at its worst,
but at least I got a blog idea out of it.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
Perfection
*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
We all love perfection. We want to be perfect. But what does this mean?
In particular what would the characteristics of a "perfect" risk system
be?
As I have written about before, risk is messy. Messy and perfect do not go
together. Risk managers should never forget this.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
We all love perfection. We want to be perfect. But what does this mean?
In particular what would the characteristics of a "perfect" risk system
be?
As I have written about before, risk is messy. Messy and perfect do not go
together. Risk managers should never forget this.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Tuesday, April 1, 2014
Exams
*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
In a previous blog I wrote about the cheating scandal surrounding the Air
Force and the required exams for those who control nuclear missiles. As a
university professor I hate exams for many reasons. First off, students
study for the exam, rather than to learn (which is especially stupid if you
need the subject material in your profession). I also hate exams because
they lead to marking. I hate exams since they show clearly where I have
failed as a professor. I hate exams as they lead to cheating. I hate
exams because they are a pain in the big fat posterior to create.
However the best reason to hate exams is something that I read today; "This
is what I hate about exams. They only show you can answer somebody else's
question, when the most important thing is: Can you ask a new question?
It's the new questions that produce huge advances ..."[1] [2]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] [3] Joshua M. Epstein, 2008, "Why Model?", Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation, Vol. 11, no. 4 12
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] #_ftn1
[3] #_ftnref1
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
In a previous blog I wrote about the cheating scandal surrounding the Air
Force and the required exams for those who control nuclear missiles. As a
university professor I hate exams for many reasons. First off, students
study for the exam, rather than to learn (which is especially stupid if you
need the subject material in your profession). I also hate exams because
they lead to marking. I hate exams since they show clearly where I have
failed as a professor. I hate exams as they lead to cheating. I hate
exams because they are a pain in the big fat posterior to create.
However the best reason to hate exams is something that I read today; "This
is what I hate about exams. They only show you can answer somebody else's
question, when the most important thing is: Can you ask a new question?
It's the new questions that produce huge advances ..."[1] [2]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] [3] Joshua M. Epstein, 2008, "Why Model?", Journal of Artificial
Societies and Social Simulation, Vol. 11, no. 4 12
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] #_ftn1
[3] #_ftnref1
Monday, March 31, 2014
Robert May
*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
Robert May is a leading biologist who introduced the use of mathematical
models and more specifically complexity into the field of biology. In my
work of writing about and consulting on complexity, I have often come across
the work of Dr. May, even though finance and risk management is about as far
away from biology as any two fields can be.
Robert May should be required reading for risk managers. Dr. May's work
into theoretical ecology and biodiversity shares a surprising amount of
commonality with risk management; in particular the focus on modeling within
the context of complexity.
His article titled "Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Biology"[1] [2]
should be required reading for anyone who deals with risk models. Loosely
paraphrasing one of the arguments in the article, May laments the fact that
the proliferation and ready access to computer models has allowed those who
do not understand the mathematics to use models without an intuitive
understanding of the mathematics, nor an understanding of the weaknesses and
assumptions of the mathematics that underlie the computer models. In his
words, "I think this can be worrying." I too think it is worrying.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] [3] Robert M. May, "Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Biology",
Science, Vol. 303, February 6, 2004
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] #_ftn1
[3] #_ftnref1
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
Robert May is a leading biologist who introduced the use of mathematical
models and more specifically complexity into the field of biology. In my
work of writing about and consulting on complexity, I have often come across
the work of Dr. May, even though finance and risk management is about as far
away from biology as any two fields can be.
Robert May should be required reading for risk managers. Dr. May's work
into theoretical ecology and biodiversity shares a surprising amount of
commonality with risk management; in particular the focus on modeling within
the context of complexity.
His article titled "Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Biology"[1] [2]
should be required reading for anyone who deals with risk models. Loosely
paraphrasing one of the arguments in the article, May laments the fact that
the proliferation and ready access to computer models has allowed those who
do not understand the mathematics to use models without an intuitive
understanding of the mathematics, nor an understanding of the weaknesses and
assumptions of the mathematics that underlie the computer models. In his
words, "I think this can be worrying." I too think it is worrying.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] [3] Robert M. May, "Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Biology",
Science, Vol. 303, February 6, 2004
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
[2] #_ftn1
[3] #_ftnref1
Friday, March 28, 2014
Nuclear Missile Testing and Cheating
*/By Rick Nason, PhD, CFA
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
By now you have heard about the test cheating scandal by members of the U.S.
Air Force who were caught cheating on their mandatory tests for operating
nuclear missiles. As a university professor I am aware that cheating is
basically a fact of tests and exams. From the U.S. Air Force example it
appears that the phenomenon occurs in all places and under all situations.
All risk managers have of course been tested on various subjects at some
stage of their life; through K – 12, college, university, trade school, or
perhaps even through taking one of the risk management certification programs
such as GARP or PRMIA. Undoubtedly some of them may have cheated once,
twice or perhaps systematically at one time or another.
Cheating on a test or an exam is of course not correct. However, is
cheating on a test any worse than cheating on an analysis being done for
senior managers, regulatory reports or other stakeholders of the firm? I am
not talking about lying about the results, or cribbing or copying the results
of someone else. I am instead talking about not doing the due diligence
required to make sure the numbers are accurate. I am talking about perhaps
assuming a given distribution for a calculation when another distribution
would give truer results. Perhaps it is deliberately not asking the right
risk questions. These are all forms of cheating, and there are many others.
Cheating is not confined to test taking.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Partner, RSD Solutions Inc/*
*/Follow us on Twitter/* [1]
By now you have heard about the test cheating scandal by members of the U.S.
Air Force who were caught cheating on their mandatory tests for operating
nuclear missiles. As a university professor I am aware that cheating is
basically a fact of tests and exams. From the U.S. Air Force example it
appears that the phenomenon occurs in all places and under all situations.
All risk managers have of course been tested on various subjects at some
stage of their life; through K – 12, college, university, trade school, or
perhaps even through taking one of the risk management certification programs
such as GARP or PRMIA. Undoubtedly some of them may have cheated once,
twice or perhaps systematically at one time or another.
Cheating on a test or an exam is of course not correct. However, is
cheating on a test any worse than cheating on an analysis being done for
senior managers, regulatory reports or other stakeholders of the firm? I am
not talking about lying about the results, or cribbing or copying the results
of someone else. I am instead talking about not doing the due diligence
required to make sure the numbers are accurate. I am talking about perhaps
assuming a given distribution for a calculation when another distribution
would give truer results. Perhaps it is deliberately not asking the right
risk questions. These are all forms of cheating, and there are many others.
Cheating is not confined to test taking.
[1] https://twitter.com/rsdsolutions
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)