Showing posts with label global financial crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label global financial crisis. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 1, 2012

Risks from Reduced Asset Quality

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

The financial crisis has raised concerns about sovereign debt sustainability has reinforced the notion that no asset can be viewed as truly safe. Recent rating downgrades of sovereigns previously considered to be virtually riskless have reaffirmed that even highly rated assets are subject to risks.  The notion of riskless assets—implicit in credit rating agencies’ highest ratings has created a false sense of security, especially as the demand for these assets increase while supply shrinks.

 

The International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) Safe Assets: Financial System Cornerstone? (April 2012).  Report looks at the role of safe assets; the effects of different regulatory, pol­icy, and market distortions; and potential future pressure points.

 

Safe assets have varied functions in financial markets, including as a store of value, collateral in repurchase and derivatives markets, key instruments in fulfilling prudential requirements, and pricing benchmarks. Without distortions, safety is priced efficiently, reflecting demand-supply dynamics.

 

The demand and supply imbalances in global markets for top rated assets are not new. Prior to the crisis, current account imbalances encouraged safe asset purchases by reserve managers and sover­eign wealth funds. Now, demand is being driven by periods of uncertainty, the lack of clarity about regulatory reforms, increased collateral needs for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions and the use of such assets in central bank operations.

 

Conversely, on the supply side, GFSR report estimates the number of safe sovereigns may decline by $9 trillion by 2016, or 16 percent.  Shortages of safe assets could also lead to more short-term spikes in asset volatility, and shortages of liquid, stable collateral. If collateral became too expensive, funding markets would be compelled to accept lower-quality collateral, raising funding costs. The shrinking supply of safe assets, now limited to high-quality sovereign debt, coupled with growing demand, can have negative implications for global financial stability. It will increase the price of safety and compel investors to move down the safety scale as they scramble to obtain scarce assets. Safe asset scarcity could lead to more short-term volatility jumps, herding behavior, and runs on sovereign debt.

 

In the case of banks, the preferential treatment of sovereign debt in banking regulations can increase the use leverage. The upward bias to capitalization ratios can lead to overestimation of the capital buffer available during periods of market stress. Under current regulations, banks’ holdings of debt issued by their own governments—and in the case of the European Union, of the debt of any sovereign in the Union—are commonly assigned zero risk weights. 

 

To mitigate the risks to financial stability, policymakers need to strike a balance between flexibility, the soundness of financial institutions and the costs associated with a too-rapid acquisition of safe assets.  Specifically, the careful design of some prudential rules could help increase the differentiation in the safety characteristics of eligible safe assets and limit potential runs on individual types of assets.  On the supply side, desirable policies include improving fiscal fundamentals and encouraging the private production of safe assets through improved securitization practices.  These efforts can remove impediments that may inhibit safe asset markets from moving to a new price for “safety.”

For more on this follow the link:  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/pdf/c3.pdf

 

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Four Hard Truths for 2011 – Risks for 2012

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

History is the science of things which are never repeated (P. Valery)

 

The year 2011 was supposed to be the year that broke the back of the global crisis.  However, the crisis is still with us as the North Atlantic banking part of the crisis morphed into the Eurozone crisis.  The persistence of the European sovereign debt crisis risks moving toward a full-blown banking crisis.  The impact of slower growth in the advanced countries now threatens emerging economies.  Olivier Blanchard, the chief IMF Economist, looks at some of these issues in a VOXEU communique called “Blanchard on 2011’s four hard truths” dated December 23rd.

 

The global economy entered 2011 in a recovery mode, although weak and unbalanced.  However the issues appeared tractable: dealing with excessive US housing debt, adjustment of countries on the periphery of Europe, how to handle volatile capital flows to emerging markets and to improve financial sector regulation.  It was a long agenda, but appeared within reach.  As the year draws to a close, a number is issues remain unresolved: the recovery in many advanced countries is at a standstill, the implications of a potential breakup of the Eurozone and the possibilities that conditions could deteriorate.

 

The four main lessons that Blanchard sees: the global economy is in a state of self-fulfilling outcomes of pessimism or optimism with major macroeconomic implications.  The self-fulfilling attacks can lead to bank runs which reduce the distance between a sovereign debt crisis and a full-fledged banking crisis.  Government entities have provided liquidity to ensure market interest rates remain reasonable.  The main risks remain for banks in Europe and the rollover of sovereign debt.

 

Secondly, incomplete or partial policy measures can make things worse.  We have seen how perception got worse after high-level meetings in Europe promised a solution, but delivered only half without details.  The announcement was made with great fanfare, but turned out insufficient with potential obstacles.

 

Thirdly, financial investors are schizophrenic about fiscal consolidation and growth.  Investors react favorably to positive news on fiscal consolidation, but tend to ignore lower growth which can lead to increase, not a decrease, on risk spreads on government bonds.  Fiscal consolidation is required to reduce debt to prudent levels, but not to produce stagnation “slow and steady wins the race”.

 

Lastly, perception molds reality.  This was the case of conditions in Europe.  Once Italy was considered as a risk, the perception did not go away.  The concern about the viability of the European economy led to concerns about the possible breakup for the Eurozone.

 

If you put the four factors together, you can explain why entering into 2012 why macroeconomic risks have increased.  It will be harder for officials to put the recovery back on track than it was a year ago.  Fiscal consolidation is required without causing growth stagnation.  Central banks and governments will be required to provide liquidity as a backstop to prevent a bank runs and avoid multiple equilibria.  It will require plans not only announced, but implemented with full disclosure and effective collaboration among all involved.

 

We have to learn from our mistakes in 2011, otherwise 2012 is going to be a period of higher risks.  The alternative is just too unattractive.

 

For more on this follow the link:  www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7475