Monday, December 5, 2011

Why

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

 

As a kid I was a royal pain (some – maybe most – of the people who know me now might say that not a lot has changed).  I was always asking my parents why this and why that.  Everything was one big question to me.  Fortunately my parents were patient and answered my questions and then when fatigue set in they would send me to the bookstore.  My addiction with questions is probably what led me into studying science at school.

 

Kids in general tend to be very curious.  They ask lots of questions, and they ask lots of layers of questions. Kids think their parents are smart, as their parents (and teachers) have answers.  It is fun being a kid – ask a question and get an answer.  Now as a parent I realize that sometimes the answers were not quite as accurate and true as I originally thought. 

 

Do we as risk mangers ask lots of questions – or do we try to play the role of grownups in always having an answer (no matter how flimsy or inaccurate)?  Count how many times today you ask why, and how many times you give an answer to someone else’s question (implied or explicit).  What is your question to answer ratio?  Are you a parent or a kid?  Which should you be as a risk manager?

Thursday, December 1, 2011

“Bad Recipe” for Risk Management – The Agency Problem

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

The Wall Street Journal of November 23, 2011, focusing on the demise of MF Financial, noted flaws in their risk management – the lack of accountability for decisions.  The article noted that decisions made by MF Financial CEO Jon Corzine, on his European sovereign debt trades of $6.3 billion, lacked proper supervision.  The typical trader would have position limits and require approvals from the head trader, the risk manager, chief risk officer, the CEO and eventual approval by the Board of Directors.  In the case of Mr. Corzine, it was only the Board of Directors, and most likely, reviewed well after the positions were established or sometimes called the agency problem (conflict on incentives).  The failure to implement an effective risk management system resulted in the demise of MF Financial.

 

The US bi-partisan Super Committee on deficit reduction failed to reach an agreement by the November 23, 2011 deadline imposed by Congress.  The lack of a clear outcome and responsibility by politicians pose a special problem for risk management – the agency problem.  The agency problem, or sometimes referred to the agency dilemma, attempts to address difficulties that may occur under periods of incomplete or asymmetric information when a principal (voter) hires an agent (congressmen), to address a problem of moral hazard (weak economy) with a potential conflict of interest.  The problem is when the agent (congressmen) acts for their own self-interest rather than that of the principal’s interest (restoring economic growth).  A recent example is the no-tax pledge made by Congressmen to Grover Norquist, of the lobbying group “Taxpayer Protection Pledge”.  Mr. Norquist does not have any accountability to voters on the economy.     

 

As a result, a number of automatic spending cuts are supposed to kick-in 2013.  The nastiness of the cuts and their potential implications were expected to encourage lawmakers to strike a deal.  It now appears that Congressional leaders will be unable to reach a compromise as special interest groups try to limit/offset the impact of mandatory spending cuts implemented in 2013.  The question becomes how long will this impasse persist?  It could last until the election looming in November of 2012.

 

Under the current incentive system, US Congressmen have little incentive to reach a compromise to tackle the debt problem and adopt policies to restore economic growth.  It was noted in an earlier column in VOXEU on November 23, 2011 that the surge in political uncertainty comes at a cost. A recent note Policy uncertainty and the stalled recovery (Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom & Steve Davis, VOXEU, October 22nd) address these issues.  The authors distinguish between economic uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty, constructing an index to measure policy-related uncertainty and argue that reducing policy uncertainty would raise output and add dramatically to job creation.  The authors noted that if their index for policy uncertainty was restored to 2006 levels, it could result in a rise of industrial production by 4% and the creation of 2.5 million jobs over 18 months.  This may not be enough to create a booming economy, but it is a step in the right direction.

 

The lack of clear accountability of Congress (agent) to the voter (principal) will likely result in a stagnant economy through 2012.  The failure to implement an effective risk management system for politicians has a cost for the US economy.  Politicians need to learn the lessons on risk management from MF Financial.

 

A reference for the Baker, Bloom & Davis paper.

www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7137 

Friday, November 25, 2011

How do you recognise the best risk manager?

by Stephen McPhie, CA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

Is the best risk manager the one who has the best solutions?  Is it the one with the most experience, the best grasp of technical fundamentals, the one with the best solutions?  Is the best risk manager the one who understands the optimum risk appetite for his or her organization?  I would contend that it’s none of these.  The best risk manager is the one who asks the best questions.

Thursday, November 24, 2011

Quantitative Inflation

By Stephen McPhie, CA

RSD Solutions Inc.,

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

The American and British cure for many of our current ills has been printing money. Quantitative easing as those who practice it are concerned.  Germans, especially the head of the Bundesbank are dead set against it.  They view it as a way to let some countries off the hook.  They also believe it will lead sooner or late rot inflation – a logical view. 

 

Perhaps like many, for or against it, you just desperately hope for the best and that it will work somehow and lead to strong growth.  However, if you are a financial executive in the US or UK, do you also countenance the inflation possibility?  A medium term view is important and the consequences of inflation should be considered in risk management.  In spite of a benign rate environment, caused partly by flight to quality), consequences include higher interest rates.

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

The Cost of Political Gridlock and Uncertainty

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

The waning confidence in US political leadership threatens global financial markets as the super committee has failed to reach a plan for deficit reduction.  This failure is leading investors to wonder how long the debt overhang will impact the struggling economy.  There is concern that an impasse could last until the November 2012 election as politicians haggle over mandatory spending cuts.


The political gridlock in Washington has a cost and that is the focus of this communique.   There are two lessons for risk management: decision paralysis has a cost and an adverse incentive system can lead to gridlock.  This outcome would not be tolerated in the private sector.


In a recent column, we reviewed the cost of policy uncertainty.  Policy uncertainty and the stalled recovery (Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom & Steve Davis, VOXEU, October 22nd).  The authors distinguish between economic uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty, constructing an index to measure policy-related uncertainty and argue that reducing policy uncertainty would raise output and add dramatically to job creation.

  

Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, stock markets moved in response to economic numbers such as GDP or employment and corporate earnings.  But today, it is politicians and government regulators making comments about bailouts, budgets and regulatory reforms that are driving the markets.  As a result of diverse comments from politicians and government officials, have generated massive economic uncertainty.  This policy uncertainty is a key factor in stalling the recovery and contributing to the risk of a double dip. 

  

Baker et al constructed a new index of US policy uncertainty by combining three types of information: frequency of articles that reference economic uncertainty and policy, references to expiration of various federal tax code provisions and disparity among forecasts about inflation and government purchases of goods and services.  In addition, the authors are able to separate an indicator of economic uncertainty from that of policy uncertainty.  They note the key drivers of policy uncertainty are dominated by monetary and tax issues.  When businesses and investors are uncertain about taxes, health care costs, budget prospects and regulatory initiatives, they adopt a cautious stance.  They find it costly to make a hiring or investment mistake, waiting for calmer times to expand or consider riskier investments. 

 

As a result, the recovery never takes off as business remains cautious on making investments in capital goods, research and worker training – key determinants for long-run sustainable growth.  Investors remain on the sidelines in “safe” investments avoiding risk.  The authors noted that if their index for policy uncertainty was restored to 2006 levels, it could result in a rise of industrial production by 4% and the creation of 2.5 million jobs over 18 months.  This may not be enough to create a booming economy, but it is a step in the right direction.

 

The lesson for the continued political fiasco is that it comes at a cost.  The lesson for risk management is that inaction on risk mitigation also has a cost.

 

For more on this follow the link:  www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7137 

 

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

BRIC … BTIC

by Stephen McPhie, CA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.,

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

 

Something does not feel quite right with BRIC. The "R" in fact.  This represents a country that has shunned the opportunity for reform that could have been afforded while high oil and gas revenues have been flowing in. One where corruption is rife, the rule of law inadequate at best, the demographics are unfavourable and floods of people are getting out or getting their money out or both. One where an increasingly oppressive regime seems destined to continue for many years to come. Why is it part of BRIC?

 

Perhaps the "R" should be removed and replaced with "T". Of course, many countries in the developing world have great promise and improving conditions for growth so BRIC represents the large powerhouses among them. T is for Turkey, which looks in a very good position to grow and prosper over the coming decades and which has good looking demographics. Only problem is that BTIC does not flow so easily off the tongue.

 

What does this mean at the company level for risk managers? Perhaps little but perhaps a lot, depending on sales, supply and investment flows and potential currency movements. Such things should at least be considered in an ERM context.

 

It would be interesting to hear any comments about my "R" for "T" substitution, especially among any ex-pat Turks!

Monday, November 21, 2011

Regulation and Risk Reduction in the Shadow Banking Sector

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

The shadow banking system is vast and plays an important role in financial intermediation.  Analysts suggest that it played a small role in the early 1990s and now accounts for over 60% of US financial intermediation.  A question is why did it arise and become so important?  Some view it as regulatory arbitrage and others suggest it as the market fulfilling investors demand for “riskless” assets.  A recent communique by Zoltan Pozsar; Can Shadow Banking Be Addressed Without the Balance Sheet of the Sovereign (Voxeu, Nov. 16th) explains some of the issues and potential policy options.

 

Shadow banking system is the name given to the financial infrastructure that exists outside the regulator’s remit.  There are two ways to understand shadow banking: one a supply-side approach where banks use securitization-based credit intermediation process through various vehicles, funds and subsidiaries that are globally interlinked and two, the demand side which focuses on cash investors that provide banks with wholesale market funding rather than via traditional deposits.  The volume of institutional cash pools increased from $100 billion in the early 1990s to over $3.5 trillion today. 

 

The intersection of the two approaches indicates that shadow banking is a significant part of the risk-intermediation process, and for that reason the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has issued a set of recommendations to monitor its activities.  Investors manage large cash pools, which replaced institutional deposits, in the form of repos and asset-backed commercial paper.  These instruments are considered safer since they have layers of protection compared to unsecured deposits. 

 

The privately guaranteed money involves risk stripping into credit, maturity and liquidity transformation components and came about due to the shortage of government-guaranteed instruments.   The sovereign balance sheet plays into the emergence of shadow banking and the money claims against it.  The first priority is safety as mortgage pools are securitized and placed into tranches.  The tranches are put into a levered maturity transformation and funded with short-term instruments and quasi-liquidity guarantees.  Short-term money market instruments are put into vehicles such as money market funds vulnerable to changing market conditions. 

 

The FSB reform idea is to adopt measures that shorten the financial intermediation process, allowing governments to issue short-dated instruments to absorb the cash pools.  Recently, the US Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee produced the issuance of floating- rate notes to serve a similar as the issuance of t-bills as money for institutional cash pools. Regulatory approaches to design a smaller and less run-prone banking system are a key step.  A more hands-on approach is required to engineer a migration of cash pools away from wholesale funding markets and toward short-term sovereign claims.   

 

For more on this click on the link to the Voxeu article:  http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7278