Friday, April 6, 2012

Fixing Stupid

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

This past weekend signaled the start of rugby season for us on the east coast of Canada.  I have two daughters that play (although one is in Texas going to school where rugby is not nearly as popular – apparently the women in Texas are wimps, and the boys won’t do anything with physical contact that does not involve a helmet).  

 

This weekend was the local “icebreaker” tournament where the teams play shortened scrimmages and the coaches are allowed on the field so as to better coach their teams in battle situations as they prepare for the upcoming season.

 

One of the scrimmages had the parents (all except one – and no, it was not me – my daughter is the co-captain of her team) in fits of laughter.  A new player made an amazing break down the field and scored a try.  However instead of “touching the ball down” as required, she continued to run though the try zone and out of bounds – which of course nullified the try.

 

The coach on the field was of course beside himself with disbelief, and was about to let go with a tirade, when the assistant coach shouted to him, “You can’t fix stupid!”

 

With that we all cracked up, and the coach immediately forgot about the tirade.  Of course the girl who “scored” the try felt awful, but all was soon forgotten – and fortunately it was only an unofficial scrimmage, and thus the score was not of importance.

 

How does this fit into risk management.  Very simply.  In risk management we try to fix stupid.  We set policies in place against stupid.  We put in place redundancies against stupid.  We have alternatives to mitigate stupid.  Ultimately however “you can’t fix stupid!”

 

Thursday, April 5, 2012

Unconventional Wisdom – Rethinking Fiscal Austerity 2

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

We recently discussed the issue of fiscal austerity (March 1st) and the implications of being the wrong policy under certain macroeconomic conditions.  It has a certain parallel to risk management where conventional measures may not produce the optimal solution.

 

Giancarlo Corsetti, in a recent VOXEU communique (April 2nd), revisits the issue in "Has austerity gone too far?"  He asks the question is austerity self-defeating by keeping Europeans underemployed and destroying the growth required to service the debt.   Austerity has not served as a cure-all for market concerns about sustainability, especially with signs of renewed economic slowdown in Europe. Currently, austerity measures in Europe have not produced the desired consequences, but the loss of creditability by not applying it could have made things worse.

 

The debate is not about the desire for a stronger fiscal stance to manage government debt, but when should the policy mix change during periods of signs of weakness.  Under what circumstances should this change be made and limit the damage to policy creditability.  Corsetti suggests that countries fall into three categories: one, a group of countries facing a high, volatile risk premium, second, countries with strong fiscal stance and negative risk premium, and a third set that are highly vulnerable to contagion, weak financial sector and high unemployment.  The question is how to ensure debt sustainability where countries are subject to different domestic and regional differences.

 

Corsetti notes the fiscal policy debate has gone through several phases: the first phase was a call for fiscal action to avoid another Great Depression, a second phase, the focus shifted to fiscal consolidation as public debt levels surged, and a third phase, the need for austerity has become less popular with slower global growth.  Recent research suggests the emergence of a new paradigm, where fiscal contraction in a liquidity trap environment can be counterproductive.  In this paradigm, a number of advanced countries are experiencing high unemployment and underemployment of resources is a self-reinforcing policy.  The problem in the current context is fiscal austerity, alone, is not sufficient to tame nervous markets with upfront tightening.

 

The author notes the government is charged with dealing with the sovereign risk premium. Countries, with high sovereign risks, can adversely impact borrowing conditions in the broader economy and increase the cost correlation between the public and private sectors.   Private sector institutions are exposed to sovereign risk: through their holdings of government bonds and they ration credit to repair damaged balance sheets.   There are two implications from the sovereign risk channel: first, when sovereign risk is high and fiscal multipliers tend to be lower and second, highly indebted economies become more vulnerable to self-fulfilling fluctuations.

 

The presence of a sovereign risk channel provides a strong argument to focus on policies that limit the transmission of sovereign risk into private-sector borrowing conditions.  Policy options may include: the existence of strongly capitalized banks, policies that may offset high sovereign risk premia and policies that make liquidity available to the private sector.  Fiscal austerity is a necessary condition to reduce deficits and lower the risk premium.  Under certain economic conditions, austerity may have adverse consequences and other policies are required to reduce the risk premium and limit the impact on the broader economy.

 

As with risk management, conventional thinking may not produce the desired results.

 

For more on this follow the link:  http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7836

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

Edsels and Cadillacs

by Stephen McPhie, CA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

Complexity in the financial world may have gone so far that hardly anyone can understand many of the products?  Skip back to the late fifties.  Everyone knew very quickly that the Edsel was a dud, so Ford took it off the market at a fairly early stage.  The company made losses but its existence was never in danger.  Fast forward to the last decade.  Many financial Edsels came onto the market. However, not only did people not realize they were duds, but they thought they were financial Cadillacs and they kept wanting more.  We all know the result - major institutions went bust or required bailouts and the entire financial system teetered on the brink.  Risk management systems were not designed to reveal such products – perhaps by omission or perhaps by commission.  Many such systems were built on foundations of groundless optimism.

 

Do you have any financial Edsels in your business, whether investments, hedges or products you sell?  Is your risk management system robust enough to identify them?  Or are there too many unknown unknowns?

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Spring Batteries

by Rick Nason, PhD, CFA

Partner, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com

 

I know that I am a bit late with this, but as they say – better late than never.

 

A few weeks ago we “sprung” our clocks forward an hour in anticipation of spring.  The moving forward of the clocks is always a great event as it signals that the sunshine is starting to last longer and longer, and within a few short weeks that after-dinner walks will be done in the sunlight, rather than the darkness.

 

The springing forward is also used as an event by the fire departments to remind us to test our smoke alarms and change their batteries.  Risk managers should do this as well.  What parts of your risk management system – that you hopefully never use – need to be tested and have their batteries changed?  Perhaps spring forward time would be a good time to do a quick run through.

 

Monday, April 2, 2012

Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic

by Don Alexander, MBA

Associate, RSD Solutions Inc.

www.RSDsolutions.com

info@RSDsolutions.com 

 

Viral Acharya, Robert Engle & Matthew Richardson, members of the faculty at NYU Stern School, provide an update on their work on systemic risk in a short VOXEU communique (dated 14th March).  The authors discuss their method to estimate capital that a financial firm would need to raise if we have another financial crisis.

 

The effective regulation of banks requires identification of systemically important institutions.  The measure of capital shortfall is based on publically available information and is conceptually similar to the stress tests conducted by European and US regulators.

 

The authors note three potential approaches: (1) how much capital is required for an orderly rescue; (2) what is required for an orderly liquidation of systemically important institutions; and lastly, (3) how to regulate institutions according to their economic impact.  The authors prefer the latter where effective and efficient regulation requires the identification of systemically important financial institutions. 

 

A definition from Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo (2009): “Financial institutions are systemically important if the failure of the firm to meet its obligations to creditors and customers would have significant adverse consequences for the financial system and the broader economy.”   The definition makes two points: (1) what happens to the institution when it cannot perform its function due to a capital shortfall; and (2) systemic risk matters when there is an impact on the broader economy.  Systemic risk should not be described as a firm’s failure per se, but the firm’s contribution to system-wide failure.  The real systemic risk of the firm is a function of the social cost of a crisis per dollar of capital, the probability of a crisis, and the capital shortfall of the firm in a crisis. 

 

The authors provide a methodology to estimate the capital shortfall of a financial institution from its various business activities in the event of another financial crisis.  The expected capital shortfall captures in a single measure the important characteristics of systemic risk: size, leverage and interconnectedness.  All of these characteristics capture widespread losses in the financial sector are reflected in the capital shortfall and also provide information of the co-movement of a firm’s assets with the aggregate financial sector.

 

The information is based on public financial information and provides timely, accurate estimates compared to the time consuming methodology of the BIS-type stress tests.  The reader is referred to their VOXEU column and their NYU website.

 

A key lesson from this approach for risk management is that a simple, well thought out methodology, that is not time consuming, can provide the same answers as a more-complex approach.  However, the value of the results is limited by the quality of the input data.  The potential under-reporting of risk exposure, such as under Basel III, may not appear in the calculations.    

 

For more on this, follow the link:  www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7722